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ABSTRACT 
Today’s military increasingly uses automation to perform or augment the 
performance of complex tasks. Automated systems that support or even make important 
decisions require human operators to understand and trust automation in order to rely on 
it appropriately. This study examined the effect of varying degrees of information about 
an automated system’s reliability on mental model accuracy, trust in, and reliance on 
automation.  
Forty-two participants were divided into three groups based on level of 
information received about the reliability of a simulated automated target detection aid. 
One group received little information, one group received accurate information, and one 
group received inaccurate information about the target detection aid’s reliability. Each 
participant completed a series of 120 tasks in which he or she was required to identify the 
presence of a threat target and then decide whether to use an automated aid for assistance. 
Results indicate a significant difference between the groups’ trust in and reliance on 
automation. The experimental group that received little information trusted the 
automation less but relied on it more. These findings, accompanied by observational data 
collected regarding the formation of mental models, demonstrate the necessity of 
continued research in the field of automation trust. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Human-automation teams are becoming increasingly prevalent in the military. 
From typical automation roles such as supervisory control, to more recent developments 
such as unmanned vehicle operation, humans and automation work together on a daily 
basis. With growing cooperation between humans and machines and increasing 
complexity of automation comes expanding variability in performance of human-
machine teams.  
Augmentation of humans with automation influences the design of weapons 
systems and platforms. Systems are being designed for operation by a smaller crew, and 
with different training requirements for operators. However, even the best automation can 
be unreliable and untrustworthy at times. As a result, loss of trust in an automated system 
acting as part of a human-machine team may negatively affect the team’s overall 
performance, just as when a human partner proves untrustworthy. Although automated 
aids are becoming increasingly reliable, they are far from perfect. The most advanced 
automation still requires humans to identify and interpret failures.  
This study evaluated three related aspects of human-machine team performance 
by testing for differences in mental models of, trust in, and reliance on automation 
between groups possessing different levels of information about an automated aid. The 
experiment, incorporating a between-subjects design, was conducted in the Human 
Systems Integration Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School. Forty-two participants were 
divided into three groups based on the level of information they received about the 
reliability of a simulated automated target detection aid. One group received little 
information, one group received accurate information, and one group received inaccurate 
information about the target detection aid’s reliability. In reality, the automated aid’s 
reliability was the same for every group. Each participant completed a series of 120 tasks 
in which he or she was required to identify the presence of a threat in an image taken 
from an unmanned aerial vehicle. The experiment occurred in three phases of 40 target 
detection tasks each. Following the presentation of each image, participants decided 
whether to use an automated aid for assistance with target detection.  
 xiv
Statistical analyses yielded a significant difference between the groups’ trust in 
and reliance on automation. The experimental group that received little information 
trusted the automation less but relied on it more. This result, while surprising, illustrates 
the complexity of the human-machine relationship and suggests the need to train 
operators in the appropriate use of automation. These findings, accompanied by 
observational data collected regarding the formation of mental models, demonstrate the 
necessity of continued research in the field of automation trust. 
The results of this study show we have much to understand about the 
interrelationships among mental models, trust, and reliance between humans and 
automated systems. The complicated nature of each of these interrelated features requires 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Human-automation teams populate the future of the United States Navy. From 
standard arrangements such as propulsion control to more recent developments such as 
unmanned vehicle operation, humans and automation work together on a daily basis. 
With increasing cooperation between humans and machines and increasing complexity of 
automation comes increasing variability in performance of human-machine teams. 
Automation now assists in several areas of task performance, from initial information 
acquisition to analysis of options, to selecting and implementing a course of action 
(Sheridan, 2002). This augmentation of humans with automation means we can design 
weapons systems and platforms with a smaller crew in mind, or with different training 
requirements for operators. However, even the best automation can be unreliable and 
untrustworthy at times. Consequently, loss of trust in an automated system acting as part 
of a human-machine team may have detrimental effects on the team’s overall 
performance similar to those seen when a human partner proves untrustworthy.  
Although automated aids are becoming increasingly reliable, they are far from 
perfect. The most advanced automation still requires humans to identify and interpret 
failures. The May 2007 grounding of USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG-51) provides an 
example of this continued necessity. During an inbound transit of the Hampton Roads, 
the destroyer’s navigation equipment was functioning properly but was in the wrong 
mode of operation, giving inaccurate readings for depth and course. Unbeknownst to the 
crew, they were experiencing a “mode error” (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997), in which 
no one recognized that the navigation equipment was on the wrong setting for the 
situation. Despite taking visual bearings that indicated their true position was perilously 
off the intended track, the ship’s navigation team continued to rely on information 
provided by the automated navigation equipment that indicated they were on course 
(Fahey, 2007). One reason the navigation team failed to identify the problem was that 
they did not recognize the automation disagreed with what their eyes were seeing; they 
trusted that the automation was working properly, which was a correct assessment, but 
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they improperly trusted it when their own senses provided contradictory information. An 
appreciation for weaknesses inherent in automation is necessary for anyone who works 
with automation on a regular basis. 
Whether automation performs as a decision aid or as a control system, the human 
involved with it requires some degree of understanding regarding how the automation 
works. This understanding takes place at different levels depending on the relationship 
between the human and the automation. For instance, while one can drive a car without 
knowing how to repair it, a mechanic needs to be able to do both. Similarly, a student 
may rely on his or her personal computer, but does not need to know how to program it. 
On the other hand, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operator needs to understand 
both how to operate the aircraft as well as what the situation is on the ground below the 
UAV, potentially thousands of miles away. Various levels of human-machine interaction 
and of automation autonomy (Sheridan, 2002) combine to form a complex relationship 
between humans and automation that defies easy categorization. A critical need exists to 
determine what level of understanding the job requires, and how best to impart that 
understanding to the human.  
A substantial amount of research exists regarding trust in automation, starting 
with seminal work exploring how human-automation trust compares to interpersonal trust 
(Lee & Moray, 1992; Muir, 1987; Muir, 1994; Muir & Moray, 1996). Many researchers 
agree that human trust in automation is an important field of study, but little agreement 
exists on what constitutes the “right” amount or kind of trust. Dzindolet, Peterson, 
Pomranky, Pierce, and Beck (2003) examined whether human understanding of why an 
automated decision aid might err contributes to reliance on it, discovering that when 
human operators knew why an aid could make a mistake, their trust in and reliance on the 
aid increased, even when the aid’s performance did not warrant the increased trust. Other 
researchers have investigated trust in automated decision aids relative to human decision-
making assistants (Lewandowksy, Mundy, & Tan, 2000; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). 
Still other researchers have explored how an operator’s mental model of a task affects his 
reliance on a decision aid (Wilkison, Fisk, & Rogers, 2007; Wilkison, 2008). However, 
none of this research has examined the relationship between an operator’s mental model 
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of how an automated aid works and the appropriateness of their reliance on the aid. This 
is an important consideration, as USS ARLEIGH BURKE may never have run aground 
had the navigator held an accurate mental model that included both the conditions under 
which the automation’s performance degraded, and the symptoms of degradation. 
The current study investigated the impact on human-machine team performance 
of a human operator’s mental model regarding an automated aid. First, we discuss the 
background literature on which contemporary trust in automation research builds. The 
collection of literature in this effort draws primarily on sources from cognitive 
psychology and human factors domains. Drawing on early theoretical studies, recent 
research focuses on manipulating human operators’ trust in and reliance on automation of 
various types. Additionally, the current study explores mental models, drawing on 
disparate areas of study to form an integrated concept.  
B. OBJECTIVES 
This research examined how performance of the human-machine team is affected 
by a human operator’s mental model of how the automation functions. It also generalizes 
the findings to future studies of humans and automation. Specifically, this study: 
• Assessed the accuracy of a human operator’s mental model regarding 
automation 
• Analyzed the effect of varying mental model accuracy levels on trust in 
automation 
• Evaluated the effect of varying mental model accuracy levels on reliance 
on automation 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• How should we measure mental models of automation? 
• Is an accurate mental model of automation associated with trust in 
automation? 
• Is an accurate mental model of the automation associated with increased 
use of automation? 
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D. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) 
HSI is a field of study and a discipline that has gained U.S. Defense Department 
attention in recent years because it promises to reduce costs and increase performance. 
Navy HSI practitioners attempt to reduce costs and increase performance by influencing 
the design of systems across several domains. In many cases, cost reductions can result 
when a design includes automation to take the place of human operators. However, 
automation’s impact on performance is slightly more complex. HSI incorporates the 
study of multiple domains to assess the complex relationship between humans and the 
systems (automated and otherwise) that they operate, maintain, and supervise. According 
to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) HSI program’s website, the domains of HSI are: 
Human Factors Engineering, System Safety, Health Hazards, Personnel Survivability, 
Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Habitability (Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). Of 
these eight domains, five are particularly relevant to the current study. 
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is the primary HSI domain relevant to 
research on human-machine interaction. HFE comprises a number of specialties, 
including anthropometry, cognition, and human performance. The current research 
explores the connection between cognition and performance, as it investigates how an 
individual’s mental model affects the performance of a human-machine system.  
Systems Safety is an HSI domain pertinent to human-machine interaction because 
poor performance in a human-machine team can lead to devastating errors, such as the 
crew of USS VINCENNES and the people onboard the civilian airliner they mistakenly 
shot down. The current study examines the contribution of an individual’s mental model 
to improving human-system performance. One assumption of this research is that an 
improvement in human-system performance helps to reduce errors and increase safety, 
and as such, is worthy of pursuing. 
The Training domain of HSI is germane to human-machine team research because 
appropriate training can contribute to improved performance. The present investigation 
has implications for training regarding mental model acquisition and development related 
to automated information analysis and decision support tools. 
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The current study is relevant to the Personnel domain of HSI because technology 
that is more sophisticated may lead to changing the needs for people. Future recruits will 
have to understand the automated systems they will be required to operate and maintain. 
Ten years ago, a Center for Naval Analyses report forecast what the Navy is experiencing 
today:  
[W]e see a growing requirement for a future sailor who is a skilled 
technician. […] an increasing proportion of the Navy’s enlisted force will 
be sailors whose job descriptions include the following:  
• Apply general principles in technical fields 
• Define problems, establish facts, and make decisions 
• Communicate technical problems and solutions (Koopman & Golding, 
1999, p. 3) 
Today’s sailors, such as those stationed aboard Ticonderoga-class cruisers, face the 
challenge of working with increasingly maintenance-intensive aging technology and 
increasingly complex developing technology in a single platform. 
The final domain relevant to the present study is the Manpower domain. As 
increased manpower costs are driving the military to seek decreased manning, the 
solution is sometimes accomplished through increased use of automation. This solution 
itself can have unintended consequences which shift manpower needs. This shift in 
manpower manifests itself as a decreased need for operators but an increased need for 
maintainers. Additionally, personnel working with complex technology will need more 
and varied training to perform their jobs (Congressional Budget Office, 2007; National 
Research Council, 2008). The resulting, highly skilled sailors may require less 
supervision than sailors did 20 years ago (Moore, Hattiangadi, Sicilia, & Gasch, 2002, p. 
3), which implies another shift in Manpower needs. 
Ultimately, an understanding of how and why humans trust automation is vital to 
Navy force planning decisions. The HSI discipline is a multi-faceted approach to 
achieving a more thorough understanding of the relationship between humans, 
automation, and the Navy. 
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E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II reviews literature on trust in automation, situation awareness, and the 
acquisition of mental models. Chapter III describes the research methodology and 
experiment used to test the research questions above. Chapters IV and V present results 
and analysis, concluding with a discussion of directions for future research regarding 
trust in automation. Appendix A contains a coding key used for images in the experiment, 
Appendix B is the demographic questionnaire administered to participants, and Appendix 
C contains the reliability reference cards used in the experiment. Appendix D provides an 
example of the reliability assessment worksheets each participant completed during the 
experiment. Appendix E is the trust questionnaire, and Appendix F shows the debriefing 
form used at completion of the experiment. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The current study proceeds from a wealth of literature regarding trust in 
automation. We first review relevant terms in the field of trust, pointing out critical 
definitions and previous studies that laid the groundwork for the current investigation. 
We also identify challenges of measuring trust and mental models. Next, we discuss the 
relationship of mental model to situation awareness. Finally, we present the implications 
and gaps in the literature that led to the formation of the current study. 
B. EXPLORING THE TERMS 
1. Trust and Reliance 
Confusion abounds in the literature pertaining to trust in, and reliance on, 
automation. A good illustration of this confusion is found in the index to a collection of 
work on humans and automation. Under the entry, “Trust” is written, “see also Operator 
reliance” (Parasuraman & Mouloua, 1996). In attempting to provide measureable 
concepts for research, many studies have tried to clarify the difference between trust and 
reliance. In their overview of trust in automation, Lee and See assert, “[T]rust is an 
attitude and reliance is a behavior” (2004, p. 53). If that is true, then reliance is 
quantifiable because we can observe behaviors, but trust is not quantifiable because we 
cannot observe attitudes. Thus, research should focus on objective measures of reliance 
and subjective measures of trust.  
Sheridan notes that trust “can be both an effect and a cause” (Sheridan, 2002). In 
human-automation terms, repeated use of a system may have the effect of increasing the 
operator’s trust. Additionally, that trust may cause further reliance by the human on the 
automation. Additionally, Sheridan points out that when trust is viewed as an effect, it 
can mean “understandability,” or the ability of an operator to form a mental model of 




to design automated systems that encourage appropriate use by humans. This sense of 
trust, as an issue affecting automation use and affected by the system’s design, is how the 
current study addresses the concept.  
2. Levels of Automation 
The distinction between various types or levels of automation is an important one 
to consider in research. Using our earlier example of a UAV operator compared with a 
college student, the UAV represents a much higher level of automation than does a 
statistical analysis software package on one’s personal computer. Sheridan (2002) 
presents the following scale of degrees of automation: 
Table 1.   Degrees of Automation (After Sheridan, 2002, p. 62) 
A Scale of Degrees of Automation 
1. The computer offers no assistance; the human must do it all. 
2. The computer suggests alternative ways to do the task. 
3. The computer selects one way to do the task AND 
4. …executes that suggestion if the human approves, OR 
5. …allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, OR 
6. …executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, OR 
7. …executes automatically, and then informs the human only if asked. 
8. The computer selects the method, executes the task, and ignores the human. 
 
We can draw a naval analogy for the varying degrees of automation using shipboard 
systems. The Aegis Weapons System, for example, can perform several functions at 
different degrees of automaticity (from Number 1 through Number 6 in the table above) 
depending on the situation and the commanding officer’s direction. On the other hand, 
the automation involved in controlling the propulsion plant requires more participation 
from its human monitors.   
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3. Trust in Automation 
Teamwork research acknowledges trust between teammates is critical to effective 
performance. Trust in teams is simple to gauge, at least subjectively: just ask the 
teammates. However, measuring trust and its impact on teamwork is more complicated 
when one of the teammates is a machine. Muir (1987) explores literature regarding trust 
between humans and relates it to human-machine interaction. She concludes that Barber’s 
(1983, cited in Muir, 1987) explanation of how humans trust other humans also applies to 
human-machine trust. Muir combines Barber’s ideas with those of Rempel, Holmes, and 
Zanna’s (1985, cited in Muir, 1987) to create a hybrid definition of human-machine trust. 
Barber says interpersonal trust is based on expectations that 1) natural and moral laws 
persist; 2) those around us are technically competent; and 3) those around us will behave 
responsibly (fiduciary responsibility).  
Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna take a more dynamic view of the nature of 
interpersonal trust, noting that trust develops over time from predictability to 
dependability to faith. Based on work by Barber and Rempel et al., Muir (1987) proposes 
a model for human-machine trust: trust is the expectation held by a member of a system 
of the persistence of the natural and moral social orders, and of technically competent 
performance, and of fiduciary responsibility from another member of the system and is 
related to objective measures of these qualities. However, Muir also points out that trust 
is based on “the perceived qualities of another and is therefore subject to all the vagaries 
of individual interpretation” (1987, p. 531). Thus, we can gauge an operator’s 
expectations about an automated system through subjective measures while more 
objectively measuring the system’s “qualities” upon which the operator bases his 
judgments and expectations. 
Some research has investigated the relationship between trust and perceptions of 
reliability as they affect the decision to use automation. For example, Dzindolet, Pierce, 
Beck, Dawe, and Anderson (2001) equate an operator’s perception of an automated aid’s 
reliability to the operator’s trust in the aid. They claim that a cognitive comparison of 
one’s own versus an aid’s reliability leads to a perception of the automation’s utility, such 
that the operator will consider automation more useful if the operator believes he or she is 
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not as reliable as the aid. This perceived utility in turn leads to “relative trust” in the 
automation and then to automation use (Dzindolet et al., 2001). Further exploration of 
these concepts in Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe (2002) produced data that suggested 
operator trust is more likely to suffer than perceived utility because of a lack of 
understanding regarding how the automation works. 
4. Trust Calibration 
Muir (1994) defines the calibration process as setting one’s trust equal to an 
objective measure of the machine’s trustworthiness. Recognizing that human failures to 
trust machines appropriately will lead to poor system performance, Muir (1987) 
recommends increasing a human operator’s trust calibration in several ways, one of 
which is “improving the perception of trustworthiness.” Lee and Moray (1992) and Muir 
and Moray (1996) explored this theory by evaluating human operators’ trust in a 
simulated pump mechanism after it malfunctioned. One notable discovery was that after 
an initial drop in trust, operators’ trust increased as they became accustomed to the 
presence of a constant error, indicating that perhaps the operators had calibrated their 
trust in the automation. In both studies, the objective measure of the pump’s 
trustworthiness was its performance, which was poor and negatively correlated with trust 
in the machine. However, as the operators recognized the error was constant and they 
could compensate for the decreased performance by adjusting their own performance, the 
operators’ trust increased. These results suggest that humans can indeed calibrate trust to 
a level warranted by a machine’s performance. Training operators to more accurately 
perceive automation is likely to improve appropriate trust in it. Exactly how operators 
acquire those perceptions, or if they can be altered once acquired, remain topics for 
investigation. 
The concept of relative trust is related to the concept of calibration of trust. In 
their study, Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce, and Dawe (2001) hypothesized that automation use 
is the “outcome of a comparison process between the perceived reliability of the 
automated aid (trust in aid) and the perceived reliability of manual control (trust in self)” 
(p. 8). Relative trust is the name the authors give to the social process that mediates the 
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cognitive one (see Figure 1). If an operator trusts the automated aid more than himself or 
herself, and perceives it to be more reliable, the operator will use the automation. In this 
model, the effect of changing perceptions of reliability is unclear, however, and is 
explored further in the current study. 
 
Figure 1.   Hypothesized decision process for automation use (After Dzindolet et al., 
2001, p. 9) 
Expanding on the work of Muir and Moray, McGuirl and Sarter (2006) conducted 
a study that supports the notion of calibrating trust in automation in order to improve 
human-machine team performance. In this study, the researchers presented aircraft pilots 
with either no information or continuously updating information about the status of a 
decision aid designed to assist with diagnosis of icing on the wings. McGuirl and Sarter 
found that the pilots with updated information on their decision aid’s status performed 
significantly better than did the pilots without the status information. These findings 
suggest trust calibration, or being able to match one’s trust to the capability of decision 
automation, has an effect on human-machine team performance. 
A human operator’s trust in automation is important for proper use of automation 
and the resultant performance of the human-machine system. However, many researchers 
acknowledge trust is only one factor in predicting an individual’s appropriate use of 
automation (Dzindolet et al., 2001; Lee & Moray, 1992; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Other factors include preconceived beliefs about automation (believing “only a human 
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could do that task”), mental workload and cognitive overhead (deciding that automation 
use will actually reduce one’s workload instead of increasing it), and self-confidence 
(thinking oneself capable of performing a task) (1997).  
In their discussion of these and other issues affecting human-machine 
relationships, Parasuraman and Riley (1997) define three different ways humans 
improperly use automation. Misuse occurs when operators rely too much on automation, 
trusting it when it should not be trusted. Disuse happens when operators do not rely 
enough on automation, ignoring signals and alarms they regard as overly sensitive. 
Automation abuse results when designers or managers apply automation incorrectly or 
without consideration for its effects on human performance. Ultimately, they advocate for 
“[b]etter operator knowledge of how the automation works” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, 
p. 248) in order to give the best chance for proper human-automation performance. 
Training people in how automation functions seems sensible. Such training may 
reduce what Sheridan (2002) terms the “magical” nature of automation, that “[t]o a naïve 
user the computer can be simultaneously so wonderful as to seem faultless, and if the 
computer produces other than what its user expects, that can be attributed to its superior 
wisdom” (p. 174). That is, a person without an understanding of how automation works 
may be more likely to over trust it. In order to investigate this idea, Dzindolet, Peterson, 
Pomranky, Pierce, and Beck (2003) conducted a series of experiments in which people 
used a decision aid to identify a camouflaged soldier. Their findings indicate that 
information about why a decision aid might make mistakes increases reliance on the aid, 
even if reliance is unwarranted. In order to mitigate these effects and encourage 
appropriate reliance, Dzindolet et al. recommend providing human operators with both 
training on how the automation works and experience in using it. Riley (1996) also 
recommends that because training allows people to understand automation states and 
anticipate future actions, it may provide the operator with a rational basis for decisions to 
use automation or not. 
We now have some indications regarding what might influence an operator to 
appropriately trust and use automation. We turn next to issues regarding how to make 
automation more worthy of human trust. Lee and See (2004) distinguish between 
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trustworthy and trustable automation this way: trustworthy automation is that which 
functions efficiently and reliably, while trustable automation functions simply and 
transparently. This definition of trustable does not imply an operator must understand 
advanced computer algorithms, but does mean an operator should be aware of more than 
just how to monitor the automation. Among the recommendations for improving 
automation trustability, Lee and See list “[d]esign for appropriate trust, not greater trust” 
(2004, p. 74). However, little research has investigated how to determine what 
appropriate trust is for different types of automation. 
Another study examined the results on human performance of automation at two 
levels of reliability and at four different levels of information processing (Rovira, 
McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007). Automation reliability was 60 percent in the low 
reliability condition and 80 percent in the high reliability condition. The study used 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens’ (2000) taxonomy to classify the types of 
automation used. The 2007 study used one level of information automation and three 
levels of decision automation. The three levels of decision automation included low, 
medium, and high decision support, depending on the level of detail in the automation’s 
recommendation to the operator. Participants performed a series of target engagement 
tasks in each of the eight combinations. Results indicated that reliable automation 
improves decision times but also increases operator complacency, which creates a large 
cost for automation failure. Additionally, although the researchers predicted participants’ 
trust would vary with automation reliability, their findings did not support this, 
suggesting a dichotomy between automation performance and operator perception. The 
researchers propose that where decision support automation is unreliable, informing the 
operator of its unreliability and allowing access to the raw data may lessen the 
consequences for failure. Although allowing operators such access is one possible option, 
designers will need to factor this in early in the design process. That may not be possible 
with older systems that are otherwise useable. A better option to enhance human-machine 
performance in the interim may be to train operators how to cope with the failings of their 
unreliable automated counterparts. 
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Another study (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001) that provides evidence for 
evaluating trust and reliance separately measured human operators’ responses to 
automation at varying levels of reliability. Participants performed a monitoring task in 
which they could use an automated aid to assist with diagnosing pump failures in a 
simulated waste processing plant. Three experimental groups performed a series of 200 
trials with three different automation reliability levels as starting points. One group 
started with 100 percent reliable automation, another with 60 percent reliable automation, 
and the third with 80 percent reliable automation. The first group’s automated aid 
decreased to 80 percent reliability after 100 trials, while the second increased to 80 
percent reliability. The third group’s automated aid remained at 80 percent reliability 
throughout the experiment. Participants were told the automated aid’s reliability was 
unknown, but that it would change during the experiment. Results indicate that human 
operators’ reliance on automation is sensitive to the automation’s reliability, and that 
operators tend to underestimate the automation’s reliability regardless of its actual 
performance. One drawback to this study is that it equates an operator’s assessment of 
automation reliability with an operator’s trust in the automation, whereas the two may not 
be equivalent. 
Further breaking down the concept of trust into discrete definitions of reliance and 
compliance, Madhavan and Wiegmann (2007) explored how people responded to a 
decision “assistant” who was either human or automated. Rather than equating a person’s 
agreement with an automated decision aid with trust in the automation, Madhavan and 
Wiegmann break the interaction down into two separate processes. They define reliance 
as an operator’s agreement with a decision aid that a signal is absent, while compliance is 
an operator’s agreement with a decision aid that the signal is present. Their study 
manipulated the assistants’ reliability (70 percent and 90 percent) as well as their level of 
perceived expertise (novice and expert). Results indicated significantly less reliance on or 
compliance with an expert automated aid (relative to a human aid) when the aid’s 
reliability was 70 percent. These results suggest that people are less likely to put up with 
low reliability in automated aids. 
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Although trust is difficult (if not impossible) to quantify, specific instances of 
trust have been measured. Using a subjective, but empirically determined (Jian, Bisantz, 
& Drury, 2000), scale to measure trust in automated decision aids, Bisantz and Seong 
(2001) investigated the effect of source of automation failure on operator trust. Their 
experiment involved a target identification task that required participants to identify 
targets as enemy or friendly. Participants could seek the assistance of an automated 
information aid or an automated decision aid. Participants were separated into three 
groups by what they knew regarding potential automation failures: in one, participants 
were told the decision aid was vulnerable to external sabotage, in another, that the 
decision aid was vulnerable to internal hardware or software problems, and in the third, 
participants were told nothing about possible failures. At three intervals over the six 
experiment trials, participants rated their trust in the automated aid using a seven-point 
scale anchored at “Not at all” and “Extremely” for each of the following statements. 
1. The system is deceptive 
2. The system behaves in an underhanded manner 
3. I am suspicious of the system’s intent, action, or output 
4. I am wary of the system 
5. The system’s action will have a harmful or injurious outcome 
6. I am confident in the system 
7. The system provides security 
8. The system has integrity 
9. The system is dependable 
10. The system is reliable 
11. I can trust the system 
12. I am familiar with the system 
The first five questions are negatively framed, while the last seven are positively framed. 
This distinction allows for testing of different aspects of trust. Responses to the subjective 
trust questionnaire indicated operator trust declined less in the group who believed the 
failure source was external to the automated aid. More importantly for the current study, 
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Bisantz and Seong’s work validated the use of a trust questionnaire that was sensitive to 
different aspects of trust and to different automation failure conditions. 
Delving deeper into why humans trust automation, sometimes inappropriately and 
sometimes appropriately, requires a deeper understanding of several factors, one of which 
is the concept of mental models, or how people conceptualize the world in which they 
live. 
C. MENTAL MODELS 
1. Cognitive Psychology versus Human Factors Approaches 
Mental models are an ephemeral concept that researchers in several disciplines 
have studied. Cognitive psychologists, human factors engineers, and computer designers 
have all investigated mental models as they relate to their specific areas of study, with 
little consensus. Cognitive psychologists tend to accept the idea that mental models 
“enable individuals to make inferences and predictions, to understand phenomena, to 
decide what action to take, and to control its execution, and above all to experience 
events by proxy” (Johnson-Laird, quoted in Wilson & Rutherford, 1989, p. 621). This 
definition of mental models seems to fit with how Muir (1987) describes mental models. 
She discusses them in relation to the persistence of natural physical laws, viewing a 
mental model as an understanding of physical processes that allow a human to predict 
future events. However, the concept of mental models has been only tangential to human 
factors studies of trust in automation. Wilson and Rutherford (1989) criticize the human 
factors community’s lack of a coherent conception of mental model as contrasted with 
the psychology community’s well-accepted one. 
Contemporary human factors interest in mental models revolves around team 
cognition research (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 2001; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, 
& Salas, 1992). Many of these studies examine how mental models or shared cognition 
affects team performance related to complex systems. Rouse et al. (1992) provide a 
description of mental models (see Figure 2), outlining three main functions as they relate 
to human-system relations. The descriptive function pertains to a person’s knowledge of 
the system’s purpose and physical description. The explaining function involves a  
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person’s knowledge of the system’s operation and its current state. The prediction 




Figure 2.    Nature of mental models (From Rouse et al., 1992, p. 1300). 
Rouse et al. contend that an understanding of mental models as separate from general 
knowledge is necessary to understand performance where complex systems (including 
tasks, equipment, and human teams) are involved. If the descriptive, explanatory, and 
predictive components of mental models apply to interactions of human teammates, they 
should apply when a teammate is automated. Additionally, these components may help 
support an explanation for appropriate human trust in automation when an individual’s 
mental model is properly developed. 
One study in particular highlights how the difference between the human factors 
and cognitive psychology communities’ definitions of mental model translates to applied 
research. Wilkison, Fisk, and Rogers (2007; see also Wilkison, 2008) considered the 
operator’s mental model as central to the issue of trust in automation. Wilkison’s study 
 18
addresses mental model quality at three levels: none, low, and high. However, his 
definition of mental model is more about understanding the task than the automation’s 
function. Additionally, Wilkison employs a process that builds rather than measures 
mental model quality. This illustrates the gap between team performance mental model 
research and psychology-based mental model research. Team mental model research has 
focused on the sharing among team members of concepts regarding roles and 
responsibilities (Cannon-Bowers et al., 2001). The cognition-based research Wilkison 
employs relates to how humans acquire spatial knowledge, and leads to Wilkison’s 
measurement of mental models as levels of “acquisition” of that knowledge. In contrast, 
the current study uses a concept of mental model more akin to that studied in team 
research, as an understanding of what roles each team member (in this case, the operator 
and the automated aid) will fulfill in the execution of a task, and how the performance of 
one affects the performance of the other.  
2. Mental Models versus Situation Awareness 
Defining what constitutes a mental model is as elusive as determining how to 
represent one. Everyone seems to think that such conceptualizations exist in the human 
mind, but no one seems to know how to represent them or how to use them. Endsley’s 
research on situation awareness (SA) contends that a mental model is general while SA is 
specific to the circumstances one encounters on a minute-to-minute basis (2000). In her 
representation, a person’s mental model consists of relatively static components that 
develop with time and experience, while SA is more dynamic and provides input to the 
mental model, developing it over time (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.   Endsley’s model of SA and Mental Model (2000). 
If we take Endsley’s view on mental models, then we see mental models both affect and 
are affected by SA. We may improve Figure 3 with a feedback loop indicating the 
iterative nature of SA’s relationship to mental model. If SA is dynamic and changeable, 
then mental models must have similar qualities. Mental models may not change as 
frequently as a person’s minute-by-minute understanding of a current situation, but a 
person’s mental model will change and develop with experience. That is, one’s mental 
model may not be constantly changing, as is one’s SA, but it seems likely that one’s 
mental model is at least adjustable. 
 Despite Endsley’s depiction of mental model as distinct from SA, some research 
conflates the two ideas, making data collection and analyses difficult. Nunes (2003) set 
out to examine the effects of new airspace management technology (a predictive aid) on 
air traffic controllers’ mental models. The experiment used the Situation Awareness 
Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) to measure SA, which the author points out is 
used interchangeably with “the current state of the mental model” (p. 66). Additionally, 
the experiment used response time and accuracy to measure problem solving ability, 
which the author hypothesizes, will provide insight to the controllers’ mental models. The 
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results of the study indicate the predictive aid did not affect the controllers’ SA, but also 
that it may have negatively affected their problem-solving abilities. The author suggests 
the presence of a predictive aid may actually inhibit a controller’s problem-solving skills 
by reducing the requirement for the controller to develop a mental model of how to 
accomplish a task. The amount if inference required to reach this interpretation 
demonstrates the difficulty of measuring mental model as a discrete entity in human 
factors research.  
3. Mental Model as a Factor in Appropriate Trust in Automation 
Adjusting one’s mental model with experience may lead to trust that is more 
accurate. Properly calibrated trust in automation should demonstrate itself in the 
operator’s agreeing with automation under the right circumstances, and disagreeing in 
situations in which automation has shown itself to be unreliable. An operator recognizes a 
situation he or she is in because he or she has a mental model of both the system and of 
how the automation behaves in a particular situation. This mental model contributes to a 
more complete understanding of other components of the environment with which the 
operator is working. Sheridan (2002) acknowledges the theory is an emerging one, but 
that an invalid mental model is one possible cause of human error in human-machine 
systems. The appeal of mental models to explain some variation in human performance 
stems more from their intuitive logic than from empirical data in support of their 
existence.  
In the current study, mental models are treated carefully, with an acknowledgment 
that their explanatory powers are limited by their unproven robustness. We define mental 
model here as the set of rules by which an operator determines when to rely on 
automation. One’s mental model may start out as tenuous, consisting only of information 
that one receives from a source outside the system. With experience and time, a person 
adjusts his or her mental model based on accumulated information and interactions. Since 
the operators in the current study were limited in the time they had to interact with the 
automation, they could not feasibly develop an accurate mental model without someone  
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pointing out critical external cues to them. As a result, we made the external cues (trees 
and roads) more salient in an attempt to make up for the limited exposure participants had 
with the automation. 
D. SUMMARY 
1.  Implications and Gaps 
The current study addresses trust as an issue affecting automation use and 
therefore influencing the system’s design. The literature indicates that research into trust 
in automation should focus on objective measures of reliance and subjective measures of 
trust in order to design automated systems that encourage appropriate use by humans. We 
can gauge an operator’s expectations about an automated system through subjective 
measures while more objectively measuring the system’s qualities upon which the 
operator bases his judgments and expectations. The operator’s perception of automation’s 
utility in turn leads to relative trust in the automation, and then to automation use 
(Dzindolet et al., 2001). Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe (2002) suggested operator 
trust is more likely than perceived utility to suffer as a result of a lack of understanding 
regarding how the automation works.  
Although early work (Lee & Moray, 1992; Muir, 1987; Muir & Moray, 1996) 
suggested that humans can calibrate trust to a level warranted by a machine’s 
performance, research has yet to indicate the effect of changing perceptions of reliability 
on trust in automation. Researchers advocate for “[b]etter operator knowledge of how the 
automation works” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 248) in order to enhance human-
automation performance. Dzindolet et al. (2003) recommend providing human operators 
with both training on how automation works and experience in using it. Lee and See 
(2004) recommend focusing on appropriate trust as opposed to increased trust when 
designing automated systems. All of this implies that we may be able to improve human-
machine performance by telling operators how to interpret automation failures.  
We also need a better understanding of mental models, or how people 
conceptualize the world in which they live. Descriptive, explanatory and predictive 
components of mental models may help explain appropriate trust in automation when an 
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individual’s mental model is properly developed. The current study uses a concept of 
mental model similar to that used in team research, as an understanding of what roles 
each team member will fulfill. Properly calibrated trust should demonstrate itself in the 
operator’s agreeing with automation when it is at its most reliable and disagreeing when 
conditions exist to degrade automation’s reliability. 
The literature reviewed in this chapter provides a cross-section of the different 
fields from which this study will progress. The trust in automation literature provides a 
solid background regarding how people feel about, think about, and behave toward 
automation. Past research provides coherent definitions of terminology and testable 
measures of trust that this study will incorporate. Research from multiple disciplines 
supplies a faceted understanding of the intangible but crucial idea of mental models. This 
study hypothesizes that there is a difference in mental models between people who have 
little, accurate, or inaccurate information about an automated device. Additionally, this 
study investigates the difference in trust between people with different levels of 
information about an automated aid. Finally, this study tests the hypothesis that there is a 
difference in reliance on automation between people with varying degrees of information 





A. METHOD OVERVIEW 
The experiment consisted of a series of target detection tasks, similar to those 
used by Dzindolet, et al. (2002). The targets in the current study were white Ford 
Explorer-type vehicles and personnel wearing black clothing. The experiment used still 
images captured in Camp Roberts, California, on 22 February 2009 from an Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The UAV flight was part of the ongoing Tactical Network 
Topology experiment that the Naval Postgraduate School conducts quarterly. Figure 4 
shows a sample image. The present experiment included 40 different images per phase. 
Each of the three phases contained the same series of 40 images, presented to participants 
in random order to minimize a possible learning effect.  
 
Figure 4.   Still image from the experiment. 
The experiment employed a target detection device (TDD), which simulated an 
information acquisition aid (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). To achieve the 
effect of automation, each of the 40 images was coded for whether or not it contained a) 
trees and no roads, b) roads and no trees, c) both trees and roads, or d) neither trees nor 
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roads. Prior to the experiment, the researcher determined the images for which the TDD’s 
answer would be correct and incorrect. When images contained neither trees nor roads, 
the TDD’s answer was always correct (100 percent reliable). When images contained 
only trees or only roads, the TDD’s answer was correct nine out of ten times (90 percent 
reliable). When images contained trees and roads, the TDD’s answer was correct eight 
out of ten times (80 percent reliable). Appendix A contains the coding key for all images 
used in the experiment. The TDD’s reliability in the four conditions remained constant 
throughout the experiment and across experimental groups while participants’ knowledge 
and ostensibly, mental model, of the TDD’s reliability varied between experimental 
groups. 
The researcher told participants the TDD was a limited resource shared with other 
“analysts.” We gave this instruction in order to simulate realistic operational constraints 
and to prevent participants from relying excessively on the TDD. 
This study incorporated a between subjects design with three experimental groups 
each receiving one different level of the independent variable (mental model accuracy). 
The dependent variables were trust, mental model accuracy, and reliance on automation. 
This study evaluated participants’ trust in the automated aid using an empirically 
validated questionnaire developed by Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000) to measure human 
trust in automation (Bisantz & Seong, 2001; Wilkison, 2008). We evaluated mental 
models by comparing pre-existing information about the reliability of an automated 
information aid with participants’ ratings of the aid’s reliability after using it. 
Participants’ reliance on the TDD was collected via E-Prime data logging. 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
1. Selection 
The Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board reviewed and 
approved the design of this study, satisfying both the Department of the Navy and the 
American Psychological Association criteria for research involving human subjects. All 
participants indicated informed consent by signing a form notifying them of their rights 
as participants in the experiment. 
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We solicited participants through emails and personal contact. Only active duty 
U.S. military officers were eligible to participate. The study used a convenience sample 
from the Naval Postgraduate School population. 
2. Demographic Make-up 
Thirty-one males and 11 females comprised the participants in this study. Thirty-
eight participants were U.S. Navy officers, three were U.S. Army officers, and one was a 
U.S. Marine. No U.S. Air Force personnel participated. Participants were between 21 and 
45 years of age, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   Participant age ranges. 
Figure 6 shows participants’ military service experience, including enlisted time if 
the officer was enlisted prior to commissioned service. 
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Figure 6.   Participants’ military service experience. 
Most participants had some experience with computer-based games, as indicated 
in Figure 7. All participants completed the entire experiment. The first participant in 
Group A was eliminated from the data set because Group A participants’ instructions 




Figure 7.   Participants’ game-playing experience. 
Additionally, participants indicated how often they used automation in their 
military jobs before arriving at NPS and now that they are here. Figure 8 shows their 
responses. 
 
Figure 8.   Participants’ automation use prior to and at NPS. 
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Finally, most participants indicated a high comfort level with using automation, as 
Figure 9 indicates. Forty-two percent of participants preferred to use automation 
whenever possible during the military job they held prior to arriving at NPS. Thirty-five 
percent of participants prefer to use automation whenever possible in their work at NPS. 
 
Figure 9.   Participants’ comfort levels with automation. 
C. MATERIALS 
1. E-Prime Version 2.0 (Release Candidate) 
E-Prime is a set of software applications designed to facilitate conducting 
research with human subjects. Psychology Software Tools, Inc. first developed the 
software in 2001 and released the version used in this study in 2007. E-Prime v2.0 
(Release Candidate) allows the collection, processing, and analysis of data with the 
following included applications: E-Studio, E-Basic, E-Run, E-Merge, and E-DataAid 
(Psychology Software Tools). E-Basic is a programming language similar to Visual 
Basic. The E-Studio application is a graphic interface that allows a researcher to build 
and test an experiment, while E-Run runs the experiment and collects the data. E-Merge 
merges data from multiple sessions and participants into one file for analysis using E-
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DataAid or another statistical analysis software package. Figure 10 shows E-Studio’s 
graphic user interface for building an experiment. 
 
Figure 10.    Screen shot of E-Studio's user interface. 
2.   Equipment 
Participants viewed the experiment via E-Run on standalone computers in the 
Human Systems Integration Laboratory at the Naval Postgraduate School. Computers 
consisted of: 
• 24” Dell monitor 
• Dell Optiplex 745 desktop computer or Dell (XXX) 
Windows XP Operating System 
Intel Core 2 CPU, 2.66 GHz, 3.0 GB RAM 
Experiment slides advanced with the click of any key on the keyboard. Participants wore 




1. Independent Variable 
• Mental model 
o Group A received no specific information about conditions 
affecting the reliability of the target detection device (TDD). 
o Group B received accurate information about conditions affecting 
the TDD’s reliability; they were told the TDD was 100 percent 
reliable when no trees or roads were present, 90 percent reliable 
when only trees or only roads were present, and 80 percent reliable 
when both trees and roads were present. 
o Group C received inaccurate information about conditions 
affecting the TDD’s reliability; they were told the TDD was 100 
percent reliable when no trees or roads were present, 60 percent 
reliable when only trees or only roads were present, and 20 percent 
reliable when both trees and roads were present. 
2. Dependent Variables 
• Trust in the TDD, as measured by responses on Trust Questionnaires 
• Mental model accuracy, as measured via responses on Reliability 
Assessments 
• Reliance on TDD, as measured by data logging in E-Prime  
E. PROCEDURE 
 Participants signed up for a one-hour block of time as their class schedules 
allowed. Up to three participants could sign up for the same hour. The researcher 
randomly assigned participants to experimental groups (i.e., the first participant was 




researcher in the Human Systems Integration Laboratory. After signing a form to 
document their Informed Consent to participate, participants completed a demographic 
questionnaire (Appendix B).  
Next, the researcher presented the participant with one of three reference sheets 
(Appendix C). The researcher told Group A, “As you go through this experiment, please 
pay attention to the factors listed on this sheet. After each phase, you will assess whether 
any of the factors appeared to affect the automated device’s reliability. Please use 
percentages to indicate how reliable you think the device is under each of the conditions.” 
The researcher told participants in Groups B and C,  
The sheet in front of you shows the current assessment of the automated 
device you will be using in this experiment. Its reliability is affected by the 
factors listed. As you go through this experiment, please pay attention to 
those factors. After each phase, you will indicate any changes you think 
are necessary to the original assessment of the automated device’s 
reliability. 
The researcher instructed all participants to wear headphones throughout the 
experiment. Following these instructions, the participants began the experiment via the E-
Run interface. The experiment began with a mission statement, shown in Figure 11, a 




Figure 11.   Mission description slide from experiment. 
 
 




Figure 13.   Example of target personnel (circled in red) in still image from experiment. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Example of target vehicles (circled in red) in still image from experiment. 
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After a brief practice run consisting of one image presentation and two decisions, a slide 
prompted participants to ask questions. The researcher then verified participants’ 
comprehension of task performance for the experiment by asking the following series of 
questions. The correct answers appear below each question. 
• How many images will you see in each phase? 
o 40 
• How many phases will there be? 
o 3 
• What tasks will you have to do for each image? 
o Indicate target present or absent 
o Choose to use own answer or use TDD 
• What tasks will you have to do for each phase? 
o Assess or re-assess TDD reliability 
o Rate TDD’s trustworthiness 
 
If participants correctly answered all questions, the researcher instructed them to proceed. 
If they asked questions, the researcher answered them before participants commenced the 
experiment. After each of three phases consisting of 40 images, participants rated the 
TDD’s reliability on a blank worksheet (Appendix C) and completed a trust questionnaire 
(Appendix D). At the conclusion of the experiment, the researcher informed the 
participants of the TDD’s actual reliability, the purpose of the experiment, and the 
rationale for the intentional deception. Each participant then signed a Debriefing Form 
(Appendix E) indicating his or her acknowledgment of the intentional deception. The 
researcher thanked participants for their time and the participants left the laboratory. 
 35
IV. RESULTS 
A. MENTAL MODEL 
1. Scoring of Reliability Worksheets 
Each participant completed three reliability worksheets (see Appendix D) from 
which mental model scores were calculated. TDD reliability varied with each of the four 
coded conditions. Reliability was set at 100 percent when no roads or trees were present 
in the image, 90 percent when either trees or roads were present in the image and 80 
percent when both trees and roads were present. This reliability stratification remained 
constant between groups.  
The study analyzed mental model accuracy using the mean absolute deviation 
(MAD) of each participant’s answer from true target detection device (TDD) reliability. 
For example, if a participant rated the TDD’s reliability as 90 percent in the first 
condition, 80 percent in the second, 100 percent in the third, and 85 percent in the fourth 
condition, the individual absolute deviations from the true reliability would be 0.1, 0.1, 
0.1, and 0.05 respectively. The participant’s resultant mental model score for that phase 
would be the MAD, or 0.0875. An accurate mental model should result in MAD scores 
close to zero. 
2.  Descriptive Statistics of Mental Model MAD Scores 
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of mental model MAD scores by phase 
and group. Figure 15 shows a comparison of the group means of mental model MAD 
scores by phase. Table 3 depicts the descriptive statistics of mental model MAD scores 






Table 2.   Descriptive Statistics of Mental Model MAD Scores by Phase and Group 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Group A Phase 1 Mental Model 14 .162500 .1992775 .0125 .6500
Group B Phase 1 Mental Model 14 .044464 .0614815 .0000 .2250
Group C Phase 1 Mental Model 14 .146607 .1243738 .0125 .4000
Group A Phase 2 Mental Model 14 .132321 .2084754 .0000 .6500
Group B Phase 2 Mental Model 14 .063929 .0724882 .0000 .2750
Group C Phase 2 Mental Model 14 .124107 .1265732 .0000 .4000
Group A Phase 3 Mental Model 14 .151964 .2029143 .0000 .6500
Group B Phase 3 Mental Model 14 .066607 .0623314 .0000 .2375





Figure 15.   Mean mental model MAD scores by group and phase. Lower values indicate 
participants’ ratings of TDD reliability were closer to the TDD’s true reliability. 
A score of zero indicates perfect agreement between participant’s assessment and 
the truth. 
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Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics of Mental Model MAD Scores by Group 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Group A across phases MAD 14 .148929 .2022524 .0042 .6500
Group B across phases MAD 14 .058333 .0629009 .0000 .2458
Group C across phases MAD 14 .127500 .1024898 .0167 .2917
 
 
Figure 16.   Mental model MAD scores by group. Lower values indicate participants’ 
ratings of TDD reliability were closer to the TDD’s true reliability. A score of 
zero indicates perfect agreement between participant’s assessment and the truth. 
3. Statistical Analyses of Mental Model MAD Scores 
Since the data were not normally distributed and contained quite a bit of variance, 
mental model scores were analyzed using nonparametric means. Analysis of mental 
model scores was conducted first within groups by phase, then within phases by groups. 
Friedman tests indicated no significant differences within groups by phase (Group A p = 
0.052, Group B p = 0.074, and Group C p = 0.559). Friedman tests within phase by 
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groups yielded significant differences between groups in Phase 1 (p = 0.002), but not in 
Phase 2 (p = 0.479) or Phase 3 (p = 0.052). Table 4 shows the results of the Friedman test 
on mental model MAD scores from Phase 1. 
Table 4.   Results of Friedman Test on Mental Model MAD Scores after Phase 1 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Group A Phase 1 Mental Model 2.39
Group B Phase 1 Mental Model 1.25






a. Friedman Test 
Finally, because phase contributed little to the outcome, mental model scores 
were analyzed using each group’s MAD score across all phases. This analysis indicated 











Table 5.   Results of Friedman Test on Mental Model MAD Scores Across Phases 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Group A across phases MAD 2.29
Group B across phases MAD 1.50







1. Scoring of Trust Questionnaire 
This study used a Trust Questionnaire (Appendix E) developed by Jian, Bisantz, 
and Drury (2000). Using a seven-point Likert scale, participants rated their level of 
agreement with a series of statements about the target detection device’s (TDD’s) 
trustworthiness. The first five statements are negatively framed, such as “The system is 
deceptive.” The last seven statements are positively framed, such as “The system is 
dependable.” Thus, low agreement levels with the negatively framed questions should 
indicate greater trust in the system, while low agreement levels with positively framed 
questions should indicate less trust in the system. Following the Jian et al. example, this 
study analyzed the results of the questionnaire according to their categorization as 
responses to negatively or positively framed statements. 
2. Descriptive Statistics of Trust Questionnaire Responses 
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics of responses to negatively framed questions 
on the trust questionnaire. Figure 17 shows a comparison of the means by group and 
phase. On this portion of the questionnaire, lower response scores indicate disagreement 
with statements such as, “The system is deceptive.” 
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Table 6.   Descriptive Statistics of Responses to Negatively Framed Trust Questions within 
Phases by Group 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Group A Phase 1 Negative Mean 14 2.5429 1.41079 1.00 6.80
Group B Phase 1 Negative Mean 14 2.5571 1.14805 1.00 5.40
Group C Phase 1 Negative Mean 14 2.2714 .85073 1.00 4.00
Group A Phase 2 Negative Mean 14 2.5000 1.34679 1.20 6.80
Group B Phase 2 Negative Mean 14 2.6000 1.15559 1.20 5.40
Group C Phase 2 Negative Mean 14 2.3000 .81430 1.00 4.00
Group A Phase 3 Negative Mean 14 2.5429 1.31366 1.20 6.80
Group B Phase 3 Negative Mean 14 2.3286 1.13573 1.40 5.60
Group C Phase 3 Negative Mean 14 2.2429 1.06750 1.00 4.60
 
 
Figure 17.   Means of responses to negatively framed trust questions by group and phase. 




The study next examined the positively framed portion of the questionnaire. In 
this data set, higher scores indicate greater agreement with statements such as, “The 
system is trustworthy.” Table 7 contains descriptive statistics of those data within phase 
by group. Figure 18 shows a comparison of the means by group and phase. 
Table 7.   Descriptive Statistics of Responses to Positively Framed Trust Questions within 
Phases by Group 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Group A Phase 1 Positive Mean 14 3.9796 1.65261 1.00 6.71
Group B Phase 1 Positive Mean 14 4.2755 1.04147 2.43 5.86
Group C Phase 1 Positive Mean 14 4.7704 1.18142 2.29 7.00
Group A Phase 2 Positive Mean 14 3.8163 1.58726 1.00 6.14
Group B Phase 2 Positive Mean 14 4.5408 1.13206 2.00 6.29
Group C Phase 2 Positive Mean 14 4.6224 1.16005 2.29 6.00
Group A Phase 3 Positive Mean 14 3.8980 1.67672 1.00 6.43
Group B Phase 3 Positive Mean 14 4.6905 1.32543 2.67 6.57




Figure 18.   Means of responses to positively framed trust questions by group and phase. 
Lower scores on this portion indicate lower trust. 
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3. Statistical Analyses of Trust Questionnaire Responses 
Analysis of trust questionnaire data was divided into responses to negatively 
framed questions and responses to positively questions. Phase had no significant effect on 
the outcome of the analysis, so data were analyzed only by groups. A Friedman test on 
responses to negatively framed questions indicated no difference between the groups (p = 
0.818). A Friedman test on responses to positively framed questions yielded a significant 
difference between groups (p = 0.005). Table 8 shows the results of that analysis, and 
Figure 19 provides a graph of the group means. 
Table 8.   Results of Friedman Test on Responses to Positively Framed Trust Questions 
Ranks 
 Mean Rank 
Group A Positive Mean 1.60
Group B Positive Mean 2.18










Figure 19.   Group means of responses to positively framed trust questions. Y-axis 
indicates level of agreement from low to high on a seven-point Likert scale. 
C. RELIANCE ON AUTOMATION 
1. Measures of Reliance 
Reliance on the target detection device (TDD) in the study was measured by the 
participant’s choice to use the TDD or not. After each stimulus slide, the participant 
pressed ‘1’ to use his or her own answer to the target detection task, or ‘2’ to use the 
TDD. Each of the 42 participants made this decision 120 times in the experiment. 
2. Descriptive Statistics of Reliance Data 
Table 9 contains the frequency count and percentages by group and phase for 
TDD reliance. Figure 20 depicts the total percentage (by group) of trials in which 






Table 9.   Frequency and Percentage of TDD Reliance by Group and Phase 
 
    TDD Use 
    Used own answer Used TDD 
    Count Row N % Count Row N % 
1 362 64.6% 198 35.4% 
2 343 61.3% 217 38.8% 
A Phase 
3 337 60.2% 223 39.8% 
1 398 71.1% 162 28.9% 
2 380 67.9% 180 32.1% 
B Phase 
3 367 65.5% 193 34.5% 
1 355 63.4% 205 36.6% 
2 386 68.9% 174 31.1% 
Group 
C Phase 
3 385 68.8% 175 31.3% 
 
 
Figure 20.   Percent of total trials in which participants used their own answer or used the 
TDD, by group. 
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3. Statistical Analyses of Reliance Data 
This study used Chi-square tests to examine the effect of group membership on 
TDD reliance. The analysis indicated a significant difference between the groups’ TDD 
usage (p = 0.002). Table 10 shows the results of that analysis. 





Pearson Chi-Square 15.879 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 15.775 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.321 1 .002 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A.  HYPOTHESIS ONE 
This study found little evidence to support the hypothesis that mental model 
accuracy varied between groups having little, inaccurate, or accurate information about 
factors affecting automation’s reliability. Mental model as measured by deviation of 
participants’ answers from the truth did not vary between groups significantly overall. 
Although Group A’s mental model appears to have changed over the course of the 
experiment, there is not enough evidence to support the hypothesis (p = 0.052) nor to 
determine if their mental models became more accurate or not.  
The significant difference found between groups in Phase 1 (p = 0.002) is not 
surprising since each of the groups had different information at the start of the 
experiment; at the end of Phase 1 the participants had likely not yet changed their mental 
models from what they had been told. The fact that no significant differences were found 
between groups in Phase 2 (p = 0.479) and Phase 3 (p = 0.052) indicates that the 
between-group mental model differentiation may have been reduced. The reduction 
between groups could be a result of converging mental model accuracy as participants 
gained experience with the target detection device (TDD).  
Despite the lack of statistically significant differences among the groups, trends in 
the data bear further examination. Figure 21 depicts the change in group MAD scores 
over the three phases. As expected, Group B remained the group with the lowest score on 
mental model deviation. Since this group had accurate information from the beginning of 
the experiment, it is not surprising that their experience with the TDD did not change 
their mental model. However, Group A’s mean mental model score vacillated from larger 
to smaller then back to larger, indicating a possible inability to build an accurate mental 
model. This may have been a result of that group’s having very little information on 
which to build a mental model regarding the TDD’s reliability. 
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Figure 21.   Change in mean mental model MAD scores by group and phase. 
Group C’s mean mental model score grew increasingly smaller from Phase 1 to Phase 3, 
indicating the possibility of an improvement in mental model accuracy over time. 
Participants in Group C may have realized that the TDD was more reliable than they 
were informed at the start of the experiment. Participants in Group C would have had to 
factor in their experiences to rate the TDD’s reliability and their ratings provide some 
evidence of a gradual increase in mental model accuracy regarding that reliability. 
These results support Endsley’s (2000) description of mental models as being 
affected by operators’ perceptions, and confirm the complexity of developing mental 
model accuracy. Post hoc evaluation of participants’ reliability assessments showed that 
many participants kept track of the four environmental conditions and the TDD’s record 
of reliability. Four participants each in Group A, Group C, and five in Group B kept 
similar notes. Some participants asked the researcher if note taking was permitted, while 
some did not. The researcher permitted note taking when asked. Representative samples 
of the notes are shown in Figures 22, 23, and 24. 
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Figure 22.   Example of Group A participant’s notes on reliability assessment worksheet. 
 
Figure 23.   Example of Group B participant’s notes on reliability assessment worksheet. 
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Figure 24.   Example of Group C participant’s notes on reliability assessment worksheet. 
The notes were similar in nature across groups. Table 11 shows the correlation of notes 
with mental model accuracy by group. Since higher MAD scores indicate less accurate 
mental models, the negative correlation between MAD score and note taking implies note 
taking improves mental model accuracy. Thus, the presence of notes positively correlates 
with participants’ mental model accuracy. The notes also suggest that, regardless of the 
accuracy of information operators have prior to working with automation, they follow 
similar unwritten rules about how to assess reliability. 
Table 11.   Correlation between Note Taking and Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) of 











Perhaps the participants who kept notes had higher “resolution,” or greater certainty, 
because they correctly assessed the specific conditions that degraded the TDD’s 
performance (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998). It seems reasonable to suppose 
that higher resolution regarding the TDD’s reliability is demonstrated in lower mental 
model MAD scores or higher mental model accuracy. 
B. HYPOTHESIS TWO 
This study found partial support for the hypothesis that trust varies between 
groups having little, inaccurate, or accurate mental models about an automated device’s 
reliability. Although there was no difference between the groups on responses to 
negatively framed trust statements, there was a significant difference between the groups 
on responses to positively framed trust statements (p = 0.005). This difference suggests 
that mental model accuracy affects an operator’s level of trust in an automated system. 
The lack of statistically significant differences between group means of responses 
to negatively framed questions is surprising given the significant difference found in 
responses to positively framed questions. This result is contrary to Bisantz and Seong’s 
study, which found no separation between the responses to the two categories of 
questions (2001). Participant comments may help to explain the current study’s findings. 
Some participants noted the language in the negatively framed questions was 
unreasonably harsh. One participant specifically objected to the attribution of emotionally 
charged words such as “deceptive” and “underhanded” to “a machine.” Similar 
underlying objections may have caused participants to use the low end of the scale 
(indicating less agreement with those questions) more frequently. Participants across 
groups apparently shared this tendency, as the variance in responses to negatively framed 
questions (1.16) was lower than the variance in responses to positively framed questions 
(1.71). Additionally, 80 percent of all responses to negatively framed questions occurred 
in the lowest three scores, as Figure 25 shows. 
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Figure 25.   Histogram of responses to negatively framed questions. 
 
Although phase was not a significant factor in the results, the means of responses 
to positively framed questions over time are worth exploring. Group A, which had little 
information for an accurate mental model of the TDD’s reliability, exhibited the smallest 
change in trust over the course of the experiment. Group A’s lower overall trust ratings 
could provide support for Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe’s work that found operator 
trust is affected by poor understanding of the automation (2002). Group B, which had the 
most accurate mental model, showed a trend of increasing trust in the system over time. 
Group C, which had the least accurate mental model, started off as the most trusting of 
the TDD but by Phase 3 had noticeably lost some of that trust. Figure 26 depicts the trend 
of group means over the three phases. 
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Figure 26.   Change in group means of responses to positively framed trust questions. 
Each phase equals 40 repetitions of a target detection task. Scale on y-axis shows 
number of points on a seven-point Likert scale indicating agreement with 
statements about trust in the automated system. 
Though not statistically significant, these results are interesting, as they may 
indicate a measure of trust in the information as well as in the system. For example, if 
Group C had misleading information about the TDD’s reliability, it makes sense that 
experience with the TDD would show that information to be faulty. Since the TDD was 
actually more reliable than the participants in Group C were told, we might expect that 
with experience those participants would develop, or calibrate, their trust in the TDD. 
However, in this study, participants’ trust ratings declined. This result may contradict 
earlier research suggesting operators calibrate their trust to a level warranted by 
automation’s performance (Lee & Moray, 1992; Muir & Moray, 1996). If that were the 
case, we would expect Group C to realize the TDD was more capable than first believed 
and so participants in that group would develop greater trust. On the other hand, this 
study supports previous findings that indicate a dichotomy between automation 
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performance and operator perception of its trustworthiness (Rovira et al., 2007; 
Wiegmann et al., 2001). That dichotomy seems evident in the contrasting results from the 
mental model data and the trust data: although Group C’s mental model of the TDD’s 
performance became more accurate, their trust declined.  
Additionally, the appearance of declining trust in Group C may indicate the 
participants were actually rating their trust in the information they received about the 
system rather than their trust in the TDD itself. This is an aspect of the study that lacks 
foundation in previous research, but may be an important consideration when measuring 
trust in similar situations. 
C. HYPOTHESIS THREE 
Results from this study support the hypothesis that people with little, accurate, or 
inaccurate mental models about an automated aid’s reliability differ in their reliance on 
the automation. Surprisingly, Group A participants, who had little to inform their mental 
model of the TDD’s reliability, used the TDD more often than their counterparts in 
Groups B and C. This finding contrasts with an earlier study that suggested operators 
who have information about why automation might make mistakes increases reliance on 
the automation, regardless of its performance (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & 
Beck, 2003). Conversely, Group A’s increased reliance on the TDD may support Nunes’ 
assertion that the need to form a mental model about automation may hinder more than 
help operators in accomplishing a task (2003). Group A’s greater reliance on the TDD 
may be explained by their ability to focus more on performing the task rather than on 
assessing the automation. Group A was instructed to assess the TDD’s reliability at the 
end of each phase. Groups B and C were told to compare the given reliability information 
with their own experience after each phase. Perhaps Groups B and C evaluated their 
decisions more carefully before using the TDD than did Group A, which would explain 
some of the difference between groups’ reliance.  
It is also possible that Groups B and C relied on the TDD more appropriately, 
although data to support that hypothesis were not analyzed for this study. If the latter 
were the case, we would expect to see less use of the TDD under conditions known to 
degrade its performance.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Work remains to be done on how to measure the development of mental models 
and how mental models apply to automation use. The way people think about how 
automation works appears to influence their use of and trust in an automated system. 
With the prevalence of automated systems in today’s military, a better understanding of 
the relationship between mental models and automation use will facilitate design of 
systems and training of personnel.  
Additionally, trust is a complex human response to a dynamic relationship 
between teammates. As military teams increasingly include automated systems, an 
appreciation for the multifaceted effect of trust on automation use is necessary. Research 
into the emotional aspects uncovered by this and other studies will provide insights into 
the human need to trust co-workers (human or machine) at an appropriate level. 
Comments from some participants, particularly in Groups B and C, indicated 
confusion about their role in the experimental task. Some participants wanted 
clarification regarding how they were to assess the TDD: as an “analyst” or on its 
performance in the experiment. Taken together, such comments might mean the sample 
population (Naval Postgraduate School students themselves) is too aware of experimental 
design and as a result, some participants were trying to provide the right data rather than 
focus on the experimental task. Experiments to investigate trust in and reliance on 
automation should be conducted to the maximum allowable extent in operationally 
realistic environments.  
Given the inter-participant variance in this study, pre-testing might help determine 
people who are naturally more or less inclined to trust automation. This might allow 
better explanation of variance between participants. Post-experiment debriefing should be 
conducted using audio or video recording, to capture what participants think about the 
automation with which they have just worked. In addition, a better experimental design 
would account for correlations between reliance on automation and difficulty of stimulus. 
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The stimuli in this experiment were assessed subjectively by the researcher and the 
timing was tailored as a result of pilot studies. Future experiments should use a difficulty 
scale for the stimuli in order to analyze response times more accurately. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This study evaluated three related concepts regarding humans and automation. 
The results demonstrate that trust, mental models, and reliance are closely related and 
contribute in sometimes separate but often entwined ways to the performance of a 
human-machine system. The accuracy of information about an automated system’s 
performance influences its human operator’s trust in and reliance on the system. This 
knowledge alone is enough to warrant continued investigation into the relationship. 
This study provides some evidence that between groups with little, accurate, and 
inaccurate information about an automated device’s reliability, there is a difference in 
trust in and reliance on the automation. Although people with little information about 
automation’s reliability may trust it less, in this experiment, they used it more. This 
seeming contradiction requires further examination. Additionally, groups with varying 
levels of information about an automated aid appeared to differ in their mental models 
initially, but also may have developed more accurate mental models over time.  
The results of this study indicate we have much to understand about the 
interrelationships among mental models, trust, and reliance between humans and 
automated systems. The complicated nature of each of these interrelated features requires 
a broader and deeper understanding in order to design, build, and operate effective 
human-machine systems. In the words of one noted scholar, 
As designers, it is our duty to develop systems and instructional materials 
that aid users to develop more coherent, useable mental models. As 
teachers, it is our duty to develop conceptual mental models that will aid 
the learner to develop adequate and appropriate mental models. And as 
scientists who are interested in studying people’s mental models, we must 
develop appropriate experimental methods and discard our hopes of 
finding neat, elegant mental models, instead learn to understand the 
messy, sloppy, incomplete, and indistinct structures that people actually 
have. (Norman, 1983) 
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Although studies involving human participants necessarily mean collecting “messy” data, 
it is critical that those data are evaluated on their own terms. Only by studying how the 
nature of human machine interaction evolves can we develop successful criteria for the 
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APPENDIX A. STILL IMAGE CODING KEY 
Title Trees Roads Threat TDD Answer CorrectAns
Still1 y y n absent n
Still2 n n y present y
Still3 y y y present y
Still4 y y y present y
Still5 n n y present y
Still6 n n y present y
Still7 n n y present y
Still8 n n n absent n
Still9 n y n absent n
Still10 y y n absent n
Still11 y n n present n
Still12 y n n absent n
Still13 y y n present n
Still14 y y y absent y
Still15 y y n absent n
Still16 y y y present y
Still17 y y y present y
Still18 y y y present y
Still19 y n y present y
Still20 y n y present y
Still21 y n y present y
Still22 y n y present y
Still23 n y y absent y
Still24 n y y present y
Still25 y n y present y
Still26 y n n absent n
Still27 n y n absent n
Still28 n y y present y
Still29 n y n absent n
Still30 y n n absent n
Still31 y n n absent n
Still32 n y n absent n
Still33 n y y present y
Still34 n y y present y
Still35 n n n absent n
Still36 n n y present y
Still37 n n y present y
Still38 n y y present y
Still39 n n y present y
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APPENDIX C.  RELIABILITY REFERENCE CARDS 
Condition Effect 
No roads or trees present  
Trees present  
Roads present  
Trees and roads present  
Reference card for Group A 
 
Condition Effect 
No roads or trees present 100% reliable 
Trees present 90% reliable 
Roads present 90% reliable 
Trees and roads present 80% reliable 





No roads or trees present 100% reliable 
Trees present 60% reliable 
Roads present 60% reliable 
Trees and roads present 20% reliable 
 
Reference card for Group C 
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APPENDIX D.  RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
Condition Effect 
No roads or trees present  
Trees present  
Roads present  
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During this experiment, an “automated aid” supplied its assessment of the videos under 
scrutiny and provided its recommended answers to you. All participants were under the 
assumption that there was an actual automated information aid, when in fact, this is 
misleading; the researcher programmed responses to the scenarios prior to conducting the 
experiment and presented the responses as if an automated aid was supplying them. 
Additionally, some participants received misleading information about the accuracy of 
automated aid responses.  
We did not intend to embarrass you or to insult your intelligence by providing 
misleading information; rather, we considered the design of this experiment necessary in 
order to collect valid information about how people construct mental models of automation 
and how those mental models relate to trust in automation. Prior divulgence of accurate 
information would have prevented collection of valid data. 
If you have any questions or concerns that have not been addressed by the 
researcher, please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, 
lgshattu@nps.edu, or the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, LCDR Paul O’Connor , 831-656-
3864, peoconno@nps.edu. 
 






________________________________________  __________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
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